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IN THE SUP,REME COURT
of the
SITATE OF UTAH
BERNICE ~CULLEY, Etxecutrix of
the Estate of VIRGIL J. ·CTJLLE;y,
deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
GARFIELD SMELTERMEN'S
CRE,DIT UNION, and S. L. LE!S'.TER
President; GLEN M. JONE·S·, VicePresident; and AL ROBINS·ON,
Treasurer,

Case
No.

10247

De f en.dants.

vs.
DOUGLAS K.

~CULLE·Y,

Interpleading Plaintiff
and A pp.ella;nt

RE.SP'ONDE,NT'S BRIEF
The Appellant's statement of the disposition in the
Lower ,c·ourt is correct.

The appellant's statements of the facts are so slanted
in his favor, and in many instances, so incorrect, that
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the respondent feels compelled to restate the facts as
they were interpreted by respondent and the Lower
:Court.
On March 10, 1960, Virgil J. ,Culley, who was a
roaster operator at the Garfield Smelter and who had
very little education, and who, at the time had been
married to the respondent for more than two years,
opened an account at the Garfield Smeltermen's 'Credit
Union and at the time he opened this account he signed
a joint share agreement card. Contra to what the appellant has stated in his facts there was only one account
opened and the joint share agreement was not the type
of agreement which is uniformly used by banks and
savings and loan companies but was strictly a joint
share agreement card as was used by the Garfield Smeltermen's ~Credit Union. We feel that the distinction is
so important th~t we are setting out the joint share
agreement card as was introduced in evidence and as
is set forth on page 8-A of the transcript:
'The ---------------------------------------- Credit Union is
hereby authorized to recognize any of the signatures subscribed hereto in the payment of funds
or the transaction of any business for this account. 'The joint owners of this account, hereby
agree with each other and 'vith said Credit "Cnion
that all sums now paid in on shares, or heretofore
or hereafter paid thereon, are and shall be owned
by them jointly, ' "'i th right of survivorship and be
subject to the "'"ithdra,Yal or receipt of any of
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them, and payment to any of them or the survivor
or survivors shall be valid and discharge said
'Credit Union from any liability for such payment.
Any or all of said joint owners may pledge
all or any part of the shares in this account as
collateral security to a loan or loans.
The right or authority of the credit union
under this agreement shall not he changed or
terminated by said owners, or any of them except
by written notice to said credit union 'vhich Rhall
not affect transactions theretofore made.
Contra to vvhat the appellant has stated in his facts
the account was not carried in the name of the deceased,
\Tirgil J. ·c·ulley, and Douglas Culley, the appellant, but
·was carried strictly in the name of Virgil J. Culley. The
only connection which the appellant has or ever had with
this account or intended to have was having his name
placed on the joint share agreement card Rolely and
wholly for testamentary reasons. ·These important facts
were eompletely left out of the appellant's statement of
facts and respondent feels that they are so important
that, 'vith the 1Court's indulgence, we "rould like to set
forth, briefly, the appellant's sworn testimony. In this
regard, said testimony starting and being set forth on
page 105 of the transcript :
Question: Now this particular account which
is subject to this action, did you make any deposits
·
or \vithdrawals on this account~
.A.nswer: I did not.
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The- Court: lie admitte-d he did not.
The ic·ourt : It is also admitted that the
deceased was not indebted to him.
Question: I understand you discussed this
account with him.
Answer: ··That's true.
·Question : Did you ever have any discussions
with him about whether or not you could put
money in or take it out of this account~
Answer : No, sir, I didn't.
Question: And you never intended to take
any money out of this a.ccount, did you~
Answer: That's absolutely right.
Question : And you never intended to deposit
any money in this account, did you~
Answer: That's true.
Question : And you never intended to have
any access to this account, did you~
Answer: After dad's death, yes.
Question : While he lived you never intended
to have any access to it at all~
Answer: No sir, I didn't, no sir.
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Question: And you never co-signed with him
on any loans or deposits, and I am asking about
this account.
Answer: No.
Question: Well, didn't you stipulate in this
court that at the time that your dad - Your dad
wasn't indebted to you at any time at the time
this card was signed~
Answer: That's true.
Question: And he didn't owe you any money'
Answer: ·That's right ..
Question: And you never claimed any part
of this account during his life time, did you'
Answer: Not while he was living.
Question: And you never had any right to
withdraw any portion of it~
Answer : I stated that.
Question : And at the time you signed the
card which is Plaintiff's Exhibit One, you never
obtained any interest in the $500.00 that was in
there at that time, did you~
Answer: No sir.
Question: What did your father tell you
when you signed this card~
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Answer: He· told me point-blank I was to see
that the boys was provided and taken care of.
Question : That was back in 1960 ~
Answer: ·That's right.
Question: He was in good health at that
time~

Answer : He certainly was.
Question: And he had $500.00 in the credit
union~

Answer: That's true.
Question : And he owed some $2,302.42, isn't
that

correct~

·Answer: That's correct.
~Question :

And at the time he had in the
credit union $565.93 ~
Answer: That's true.
Question: And he owed, actually, if you deduct this, $1,728.05. Isn't that correct~
Answer: Yes, sir, that's true.
Question : D'O you know from your conversation with him that you never intended and he
never intended to give you any interest whatever
in this money, did he~ In this $500.00 ~
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Answer: I have already told you that in the
event of his death I was supposed. . .
Question: You never claimed any inte_rest
in the money which was in the bank at the time,
did you~
Answer: No, I didn't.
Question: And you don't claim that you had
any right to put money in or take money out of
this account during your father's life do you~
Answer: No.
Virgil J. Culley died on the 17th day of October,
19:63, and at the time of his death he left $770.00 in this
account at the Garfield Smeltermen's :Ctedit Union.
·He also had a Pontiac automobile and a trailer which
were in his own name, both of which were heavily encumbered and all of which was paid off by reason of insurance which was carried on the accounts which paid off
the Pontiac car, the trailer, and doubled the $770.00
which is the subject of this action. On the 21st day of
September, 19·63, Virgil J. ·Culley, deceased, did draw
a will and in the will he specifically stated, "I make no
provision in this, my last will and testament, for my
children, Buddy Lee Culley, Laurie J o Culley, Rodney
Brent Culley, D!ouglas Kent 'Culley and Chad ~Culley,
and I have purposely excluded them and each of them
from participation in this, my last will and testament,
and it is my desire that none of my children taken any
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part of my estate." He then provided that should anyone
contest the will they should receive One Dollar. The re1

spondent testified that it was the desire of Virgil J. 'Culley
that this $770.00 in the credit union be used for his funeral
expenses. ·The will did not disown his children. It is
obvious that the decedent knew that he had only sufficient money to bury himself.
ARGUME.NT

DOUGLAS K. CULLEY, THE APPELLANT HEREIN,
TESTIFIED IN T·HE LOWER COURT THAT 'THE JOINT
SHARE ARGEEMENT WAS CREATED BY VIRGIL J. CULLEY AND :THE APPELLANT, DOUGLAS CULLEY, WITH
AND FOR THE SOLE INTENTION THAT DOUGLAS K.
CULLEY, THE APPELLANT, AS SURVIVOR, IF ENTITLED
TO ANY MONEY AT ALL, SHOULD HAVE THE REMAINING FUNDS AT THE TIME OF DEPOSITER'S DE~TH AND
THAT THE SHARE AGREEMENT WAS PURELY AN ATTEMPTED TESTAMENTARY TRANSFER AND AS SUCH,
SAID AGREEMENT IS VOID FOR F AlLURE TO COMPLY
WITH SE;CTION 74-1-5 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953.
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The appellant relies on, and has cited for his position, Braegger vs. L-oveland, 12· Utah 2d 384-367, P·.2d,
177; and Tangren vs. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388-367 P·.2d
179. :The foregoing cases have no application to the present case, either in facts or in law. The ·Court will recall
that in Tangren vs. Ingalls, the case came up via a
summary judgment and this Court sent it back for a new
trial with instructions that the lower court was to dete-rmine whether or not the appellant could meet the requirement of presenting a clear and convincing evidence
with which to attack the recital of the deposit cards.
There was also some evidence of· gift to the exte·nt of
$4,000.00 and up to the time of notice there was no
question that Adeline· M. Ingalls could withdraw and
place money in the account. None of these facts a.re
present in the subject case. In Braegger vs. Loveland,
12 Utah 2d 384-367, P.2d, 177, the testimony was that
either party could withdraw money and that up to a
month before her brother's death Emma withdrew money
and deposited it in an account of her own name. The
Court further held that there was strong evidence of an
intent to make a gift.
The foregoing cases are both distinguishable from
this case in that in the instant case the sworn testimony
of the appellant himself established the fact that V. S.
Culley, deceased, never surrendered dominion and control
of this account and that there was no intention of a. gift
of any type or nature. 'The Court's attention is again
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ealled to the fact that this share agreement which is thP
subject of this action is entirely different from the usual
agreements whieh are now used by savings and loan associations. IThe ones which are presently used by the banks
and savings and loan associations set forth an agreement
~uch as follows : '''The placing of the funds in the· account shall he eonclusively intended to be a gift and a
delivery of the funds to the joint tenants to the extent
of the prorated interest in the account."

~This,

of course,

is plaeed in the joint share agreement for the protection
of the banks and the saving-s and loan associations. It is
also

complet~ ly

laeking in the credit union agreement

w..hich is· set forth herein. An analysis of the credit union

agreement shows that it was obviously drawn for the Role
protection of the credit union. 'The rCourt's attention

i~

further dra\vn to the fact that in order to make out a gift
the law requires a donative intent, the relinquishment of
domination by the donor, and an acceptance by the donee,
( Ree .Bro,vn~ Pers()nal Prop·erty, Section 37, Second Edition~ 1936). It is obvious from the facts of this case that

there was no present proprietary interest given and the
depositor, \,... ~J. Culley, deceased, retained full and compL·te interest and dominion over the aeeount. The appelL.~lt adrnittedly did not deposit into said account, could

not take funds fro1n the aeeount and had no interest in
the aecount of any ty-pe or nature exrept upon the death
of the depositor.
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It has long been the established law that in order
to make out a gift there must be an intervivos interest
and there must exist an intention that each party shall
have the present and equal right to withdraw the funds,
(see Hag-gerty vs. Haggerty, Flo. 1951, 52 S.2d, 432;
Spark vs. Canney, 88 S.2d, 307; and Murray vs. Gadsden,
91 U.S. App. D.C., 38, 197 F.2d, 19,4, 33 A.L.R. 2·d 554).
The courts are quite uniform in applying the test of a
gift intervivos, for such there is required a clear intention
of the donor to transfer a present interest, delivery by
surrender of dominion and control to the donee, and
acceptance of the gift by the donee. The rules have been
1nodified by the nature of a joint fund but the basic elements are the same: donative intent, delivery. Not the
money, in specie, in the joint fund, but a gift of an
undivided interest in the funds and a surender of an
equal right to withdraw the funds and the acceptance by
the donee, (see McKinnon vs. First National Bank of
Pensacola, 77 Flo. 777, 82 S. 748, 6 A.L.R. 111; K ilng vs.
Ktng, Flo., 1951, 55 S.2d 181; Webster vs. St. Petersbu.rg
Federal Savings and Loan Assoc~ation, 15·5 Fla., 412
20 S.2d, 400; Chase Federal Savings wnd Loan Association vs. Sullivan, 19'61, Flo. 127 S.2d, 112).
The appellant completely failed to prove a joint
tenancy in that there was no concurrence of the four
unities of time, title, interest and possession. In this
regard, the appellant had no right to put money in the
account and had no right to take it out and the original
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$500.00 had been disposed of numerous times prior to
the death of the depositor. The appellant admitted that
he had no right of possession whatsoever and the evidence shows that the only purpose in putting Douglas
Culley's name on the share agreement card was either
to make him \ 1 • J. ~Culley's agent or to create in him a
right of survivorship \Yithout any present right to any
part of the account.
The appellant obtained no interest whatsoever in the
joint account by reason of a contract. In this regard
the evidence shows that the account card was provided
by the_ credit union for the sole protection of the credit
union. The evidence further reveals that it was never
intended by the parties that the contract should determine the rights of the parties. The appellant readily
admitting that there was no consideration and that the
depositor had full and complete dominion over the account and that appellant had none. ·Thus all of the
elements of the contract are lacking.
~CONCLUSION

The ~Court's attention is respectfully called to the
fact that the lower court determined this case on the
sworn testimony of the appellant. The court properly
found that this joint fund was created by V. J. Culley
with the sole intention that Douglas Culley, as survivor,
would only inherit at the time of the death of V. J.
,c·ulley. The plaintiff clearly rebutted the presumption
that \r. J. Culley ever surrendered or intended to sur-
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render equal right to vvithdraw the money or any part
thereof to Douglas 'Culley or that Douglas Culley ever
accepted any interest in the funds during the life time
of V. J. Culley. It is obvious that the requirements of a
gift intervivos have never been met. In view of this,
this instrument certainly violates the statute of wills
and fails to comply with any parts thereof and a contrary ruling would operate to deceive the claims of those
entitled to priority over testamentary beneficiaries, including creditors and rights of widows to have their
dower set apart.
Respectfully submitted,

MARK S. MINE.R
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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